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NOTE 
OREGON NATURAL RESOURCES COUNCIL 
V. THOMAS; ANOTHER "MERITORIOUS" 
TIMBER LAWSUIT FAILS: DO SUBSTANTIVE 
RIDERS WARRANT AN EXCEPTION TO THE 
PLAIN LANGUAGE RULE? 
"We consider what would appear to be 
a relatively straightforward question 
of statutory interpretation 
with fairly profound consequences." l 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 27,1995, President William J. Clinton signed into 
law the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Addition-
al Disaster Assistance, for Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, for Assis-
tance in the Recovery from the Tragedy That Occurred at 
Oklahoma City, and Rescissions Act.2 Although the Rescis-
sions Act was primarily an appropriations bilV it contained 
several provisions aimed at expediting the award of timber 
1. Opening quote written by Ninth Circuit Judge Michael Hawkins in North-
west Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(NFRC). See infra Part II.C.l. 
2. Pub. L. No. 104-19, 2001-2007, 109 Stat. 194, 240-47 (1995) (the Rescis-
sions Act or the Act). 
3. An appropriations bill is a measure before a legislative body authorizing 
the expenditure of public moneys and stipulating the amount, manner and purpose 
of the various items of expenditure. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 102 (6th ed. 1990). 
1 
1
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harvesting contracts.4 These provisions authorized the nation-
wide release of salvage timber sales,5 expedited the award of 
timber sales covered in the President's Northwest Forest 
Plan,6 and released previously authorized timber sales.7 
The Act prohibited administrative review and provided for 
only limited judicial review of salvage timber and Option 9 
sales.s According to the rider's sponsors, these provisions 
"were developed ... to limit the opportunity for frivolous law-
suits .... "9 Frivolous lawsuits, however, do not stop timber 
4. NFRC, 82 F.3d at 828. These provisions, collectively known as the Emer-
gency Salvage Timber Sale Program, were codified at 16 U.S.CA § 1611 (West 
Supp. 1996). The cases summarized throughout this note generally refer to the 
timber provisions as § 2001, pursuant to the session laws. Sections 1611 and 2001 
are otherwise identicle and this note will refer only to the codified section. 
The timber provisions were contained in a "rider" which was attached to the 
Rescissions Act. "The term 'rider' refers to substantive legislation given a 'ride' on 
an appropriations bill." Michael Axline, Salvage Logging: Point and Counterpoint: 
Forest Health and the Politics of Expediency, 26 ENVTL. L. 613, 613 n.2 (1996). 
Both the House and Senate have rules prohibiting the attachment of substantive 
legislation to appropriations bills, but those rules are frequently waived. Id. (citing 
Linda M. Bolduan, Comment, The Hatfield Riders: Eliminating the Role of Courts 
in Environmental Decision Making, 20 ENVTL. L. 329 (1990». See infra Part VA 
In addition to its formal title, the timber provisions have also been called the "sal-
vage logging rider," the "logging without laws rider," the "mother of all riders," the 
"salvage rider," and the "1995 rider." These terms are interchangeable and most 
appear at least once in this note. 
5. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1611(b) (West Supp. 1996); see discussion infra Part HAL 
6. § 1611(d). The President's Northwest Forest Plan is commonly referred to 
as "Option 9," hence these sales are known as "Option 9 sales." See discussion 
infra Part II.A2. 
7. NFRC, 82 F.3d at 828. These previously authorized sales are known as 
"section 318 sales" and are authorized pursuant to § 1611(k). See discussion infra 
Part IIA3. 
8. § 16H(e), (t). 
9. Slade Gorton & Julie Kays, Salvage Logging: Point and Counterpoint: Leg-
islative History of the Timber and Salvage Amendments Enacted in the l04th Con-
gress: A Small Victory for Timber Communities in the Pacific Northwest, 26 ENVTL. 
L. 641, 642 (1996) (emphasis added). Senator Larry Craig (R-Idaho) testified: 
... As the process stands now, activists of every stripe 
find it easy to be obstructionists using appeals, threats, 
intimidations and false accusations in the media to slow 
down or stop the agencies' salvage efforts. It is past time 
for Congress to step in and clear a procedural path which 
the agencies can use to make responsible salvage deci-
sions and carry them out. 
Id. at 461 n.114 (quoting 141 CONGo REC. S4868-01 (daily ed. March 30, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Larry Craig». However, as of June 20, 1995, lawsuits had de-
layed harvesting of only three percent of the timber volume offered by the United 
States Forest Service. Trilby C. E. Dorn, Comment, Logging Without Laws: The 
2
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sales.lO In reality, meritorious lawsuits, which challenge tim-
ber sales that are being conducted in violation of the law, do 
stop timber sales. ll It is these meritorious lawsuits that have 
been effectively halted by the Emergency Salvage Timber Sale 
Program. 12 
Section II of this note provides a brief background to the 
Rescissions Act, outlines the Act's provisions and examines the 
Ninth Circuit Court's decisions interpreting these provisions 
prior to Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas. 13 Sec-
tion III sets forth the facts and procedural history of ONRC II, 
the most recent meritorious lawsuit to fall victim to the provi-
sions of the Rescissions Act. Section IV examines the Ninth 
Circuit Court's analysis and holding in ONRC II. Section V 
argues that although the Ninth Circuit's decision in ONRC II 
was correct under current standards, the result was fundamen-
tally wrong. 14 Section V also examines the rules prohibiting 
the attachment of substantive riders to appropriations bills, 
the effect of such riders on public participation, and the multi-
ple misrepresentations made by sponsors in the course of solic-
iting support for the salvage rider. Finally, section V proposes 
a new standard to be applied by the courts when interpreting 
the provisions of a substantive rider attached to an appropria-
tions bill in violation of House and Senate rules. Section VI 
concludes that the congressional rules prohibiting the attach-
ment of riders to appropriations bills should not be waivable. 
Alternatively, if those rules are waived, the courts must look 
beyond the plain language of the subsequently enacted statute 
when interpreting its provisions. Section VII then briefly sum-
1995 Salvage Logging Rider Radically Changes Policy and the Rule of Law in the 
Forests, 9 TuL. ENVTL. L .. 447, 459 (1996) (citing Hearings on Timber Salvage 
Before the House Salvage Timber and Forest Health Task Force, 104th Congo (Dec. 
19, 1995) (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Furse, D. Or.». 
10. Axline, supra note 4, at 614 n.5. 
11. [d. 
12. [d. 
13. 92 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 1996) (ONRC II) (Reinhardt, J., concurring). The 
cases discussed infra in Parts II.C.1-3 include Northwest Forest Resource Council 
v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996); Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. 
Glickman, 88 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 1996); and Northwest Forest Resource Council v. 
Pilchuck Audubon Society, 97 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1996). 
14. Judge Hawkins also wrote, "It is not our role to determine the wisdom of 
[the salvage rider], only its meaning." NFRC, 82 F.3d at 828. 
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marizes three additional cases decided by the Ninth Circuit 
subsequent to ONRC II. 15 
II. BACKGROUND 
Since the establishment of the forest reserve system in 
1891, the national forests have been managed primarily to 
ensure a high annual timber harvest. 16 In response to growing 
public concern during the 1960s and 70s, Congress passed 
several statutes which required comprehensive land planning 
for multiple uses. 17 These statutes required that the forests 
also be managed to protect animals, plants, soil, water and 
biological diversity.1s 
In 1995, representatives of the timber industry asked 
Congress for relief from the increasing number of restrictive 
environmental laws. 19 Although lawmakers were sympathetic, 
they knew they were unlikely to succeed in granting such relief 
by openly attacking the publicly accepted laws.20 mtimately, 
they hid their proposal in a popular initiative and then at-
tached it to the first available "must-sign" legislation.21 As a 
result, the 1995 Rescissions Act was passed, complete with its 
unrelated Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program provision, 
and the Republican-led 104th Congress succeeded in suspend-
ing decades of environmental regulations. 22 
15. The cases are Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc. v. United States Forest Ser-
vice, 92 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1996); Sierra Club v. United States Forest Service, 93 
F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 1996); and Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. 
Glickman, 100 F.3d 1443 (9th Cir. 1996). 
16. Dorn, supra note 9, at 449. 
17. Id. These statutes included the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.CA 
§§ 1531-1544 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996); the National Forest Management Act 
(NFMA), 16 U.S.CA §§ 1600-1624 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996); and the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370 (West 1994 & Supp. 
1996). 
18. Dorn, supra note 9, at 499. 
19. Margaret Kriz, Timber!, NAT'L J., Feb. 3, 1996, at 252. Since 1984, the 
timber industry has attempted to persuade Congress to exempt timber sales from 
environmental laws at least twelve times. Dorn, supra note 9, at 461. 
20. Kriz, supra note 19. 
21. Id. 
22. Dorn, supra note 9, at 499. 
4
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A. THE 1995 RESCISSIONS ACT AND THE SALVAGE RIDER 
The salvage rider was strategically attached to the 1995 
Rescissions Act, an appropriations bill that provided emergen-
cy funding for anti-terrorist initiatives and disaster assistance, 
including assistance in the recovery from the tragic bombing of 
the federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.23 The 
rider's sponsors knew that President Clinton opposed the rider 
because he had previously vetoed a rescissions bill containing 
similar language.24 They correctly predicted, however, that 
the President would be forced to sign the revised Rescissions 
Act containing the emergency relief bill, despite its inclusion of 
the rider. 25 
The President signed the Act, giving life to the salvage 
rider, on July 27, 1995.26 Although frequently modified by the 
word "salvage," the rider actually authorized three distinct 
categories of timber sales: 1) salvage timber sales, 2) Option 9 
sales, and 3) Section 318 sales.27 
23. Axline, supra note 4, at 630; Pub. L. No. 104-19, 2001-2007, 109 Stat. 194, 
240-47 (1995). 
24. President Clinton initially vetoed the Rescissions Bill on June 7, 1995, 
stating that suspending all of the country's environmental laws was not the appro-
priate way to log the national forests. Dorn, supra note 9, at 463. 
25. Axline, supra note 4, at 630. Carl Pope, the executive director of the Sier-
ra Club, stated "[t]he President evidently calculated that the risks of failing to 
pass the RepUblicans' spending bill were greater than those of failing the forests." 
Dorn, supra note 9, at 464 n.129 (quoting Carl Pope, Lawless Logging, SIERRA, 
Nov. 1995, at 18). 
26. See § 1611(a)(2). The rider designated an emergency period during which 
salvage timber sales were to be conducted according to expedited procedures 
§ 1611(b)(1). "The term 'emergency period' means the period beginning on the date 
of the enactment of this section [July 27, 1995] and ending on September 30, 
1997." § 1611(a)(2). However, a subsequent provision in the rider states, "[t]he 
authority provided by subsections (b) and (d) shall expire on December 31, 1996. 
The terms and conditions of this section shall continue in effect with respect to 
salvage timber sale contracts offered under subsection (b) and timber sale con-
tracts under subsection (d) until the completion of performance of the contracts." 
§ 1611(j). 
27. See § 1611(b), (d), (k). 
5
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1. Salvage Timber Sales 
Salvage timber sales are the first category of sales autho-
rized by the rider.28 Section 1611(b) directs the Secretaries29 
to prepare, advertise, offer and award salvage timber sales 
contracts from lands within the National Forest System and 
federal lands under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM).30 The rider defines the term 'salvage 
timber sale' as "a timber sale for which an important reason 
for entry includes the removal of disease- or insect-infested 
trees, dead, damaged or down trees, or trees affected by fire or 
imminently susceptible to fire or insect attack."31 However, 
the term also includes the removal of associated trees, as long 
as any such sale includes an identifiable salvage component.32 
This means that healthy trees may be sold under the provi-
sions governing salvage sales, as long as the sale contains a 
salvage component.33 
Section 1611(c) provides for expedited procedures for the 
preparation of salvage timber sales.34 Pursuant to this sec-
tion, the Secretary concerned must prepare a document that 
combines an environmental assessment under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and a biological evaluation 
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).35 The preparation 
28. § -1611(b). 
29. The statute uses the tenn "the Secretary concerned." § 1611(a)(4) indicates 
"the Secretary concernedn means "(Al the Secretary of Agriculture, with respect to 
the lands within the National Forest System; and (B) the Secretary of the Interi-
or, with respect to Federal lands under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land 
ManagemenC § 1611(a)(4). 
30. § 1611(b)(I). 
31. § 1611(a)(3). 
32. [d. 
33. Axline, supra note 4, at 632. In fact, the Forest Service has reclassified a 
number of healthy sales as salvage sales to take advantage of the statutory provi-
sions of the Rescissions Act. [d. at 633 (citing Wilderness Soc'y, Reclassifying Tim-
ber Sales Under the Logging-Without-Laws Rider (1995) (summarizing sales that 
have been reclassified from "health~ to "salvage" since the adoption of the salvage 
logging rider». 
34. § 1611(c). 
35. § 1611(c)(I)(A). "[Tlhe Secretary concerned shall prepare a document that 
combines an environmental assessment under section 102(2) of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332(2» ... and a biological evaluation 
under section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 
1536(a)(2» ... and other applicable Federal law and implementing regulations." 
6
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of the document is a mere formality, however, as the statute 
states that the Secretaries retain sole discretion to consider the 
environmental effects of the salvage timber sale and the effect, 
if any, on threatened or endangered species.36 In addition, the 
Secretaries need only do so to the extent they consider appro-
priate and feasible. 37 Furthermore, the scope and content of 
the documentation and information prepared, considered and 
relied on is also subject to the sole discretion of the Secretar-
ies.3s 
The rider, advanced under the guise of promoting forest 
health, does not require the Secretaries to report to Congress 
on how salvage sales are enhancing the health of the for-
ests.39 Instead, the Secretaries are required to report to Con-
gress on the volume of salvage timber sold pursuant to the 
rider.40 In addition, the rider declares that salvage timber 
sales will not be precluded because the costs of the sale are 
likely to exceed the revenues derived from it.'1 Moreover, the 
[d. (emphasis added). The combined document is called an "EAlBE." But see South-
west Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Forest Service, 100 F.3d 1443 
(9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the district court's finding that failure to prepare a 
combined EAlBE was not a per se violation of the Rescissions Act). 
In addition, § 1611(c)(1)(B) provides that in lieu of preparing a new docu-
ment, the Secretary concerned may use a document prepared pursuant to NEPA 
before the date of enactment of the Act, a biological evaluation written before such 
date, or information collected for such a document or evaluation. § 1611(c)(1)(B). 
36. § 1611(c)(1)(A). 
37. [d. 
38. § 1611(c)(1)(C). 
39. Axline, supra note 4, at 624. 
40. [d. at 624-25; § 1611(c)(2). 
41. § 1611(c)(6). Ironically, the salvage rider "rode" on an appropriations bill 
that purported to reduce the deficit, yet it contained a provision directing the 
Forest Service and the BLM to sell salvage timber regardless of the cost to the 
government. Axline, supra note 4, at 617. The Wilderness Society conservatively 
estimated that the salvage logging rider would cost taxpayers $ 330 million. [d. 
But see infra note 196 (suggesting the cost is probably much higher). 
In addition to the fact that many of these sales are unprofitable, the costs 
of federal timber are heavily subsidized. Axline, supra note 4, at 619. Current 
federal subsidies come in several forms: 1) federal timber prices often do not re-
flect the administrative or road costs of selling and removing the timber; 2) export 
restrictions allow domestic mills to bid for federal timber free from foreign compe-
tition; 3) salvage timber sales pursuant to the rider are exempt from the Competi-
tion in Contracting Act of 1984; 4) the price of federal timber does not reflect the 
costs imposed on other national forest values; and 5) sale prices do not include 
the costs borne by plant and animal species and their habitats. [d. at 619-22 and 
accompanying notes. 
7
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Secretary concerned may conduct salvage timber sales "not-
withstanding any decision, restraining order, or injunction 
issued by a United States court before the date of enactment of 
[the ActJ.,,42 
2. Option 9 Sales 
The salvage rider also authorizes a category of timber 
sales known as Option 9 sales.43 These are sales made on the 
federal lands described in Option 9, the land management plan 
aIternative selected in the Record of Decision for Amendments 
to Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management Planning 
Documents within the Range of the Northern Spotted Owl.44 
The Secretaries are required to expeditiously prepare, offer 
and award Option 9 sales and are authorized do so notwith-
standing any other law, decision, restraining order or injunc-
tion issued by a United States court prior to the date of enact-
ment of the Act.45 
a. Administrative and Judicial Review of Salvage Timber and 
Option" 9 Sales 
Neither salvage timber sales nor Option 9 sales are subject 
to administrative review.46 In addition, the rider provides for 
42. § 1611(c)(9). 
43. § 1611(d). 
44. [d.; see The Standards and Guidelines for Management of Habitat for Late-
Successional and Old-Growth Forest Related Species within the Range of the 
Northern Spotted Owl adopted in the Record of Decision for Amendments to For-
est Service and Bureau of Land Management Planning Documents within the 
Range of the Northern Spotted Owl (April 13, 1994). In 1993, President Clinton 
convened the Northwest Forest Conference in Portland, Oregon to draft a compro-
mise solution to the wars being fought over logging in the national forests that 
were home to the endangered spotted owl. Dorn, supra note 9, at 461. AB a result 
of that conference, the Forest Ecosystem Management ABsessment Team (FEMAT) 
was created. [d. FEMAT's purpose was to identify and study a range of options 
for the management of national forest lands in the range of the northern spotted 
owl. [d. The final FEMAT report contained ten options. [d. President Clinton chose 
Option 9, which reduced the amount of timber cut on federal lands and provide 
greater protection for ancient forests than had previously been provided. Axline, 
supra note 4, at 633. 
45. § 1611(d). 
46. § 1611(e). This is critical because the complex, technical nature of environ-
8
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only limited judicial review of these sales.47 A challenge to a 
proposed sale must be brought in the U.S. district court where 
the affected lands are located, within 15 days after the date of 
the initial advertisement of the challenged sale.48 Courts may 
not issue restraining orders, preliminary injunctions or injunc-
tions pending appeal with respect to any decision to prepare, 
advertise, offer award or operate a salvage timber or Option 9 
sale.49 However, the courts may enjoin permanently, order 
modification of, or void an individual salvage timber sale if it 
is determined, by a review of the record, that the decision to 
prepare, advertise, offer, award or operate such sale was "arbi-
trary and capricious.,,5o This is an exacting standard given the 
deference afforded to agency action. 51 In the case of the sal-
vage rider, it is hard to imagine how a court could find a sale 
arbitrary and capricious in relation to applicable law when 
nearly all applicable law has been suspended.52 
mental law makes courts reluctant to interfere with agency expertise unless there 
is a clear abuse of power. Paul Maynard Kakuske, Comment, Clear· Cutting Public 
Participation in Environmental Law: The Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program, 
29 LoY. LA L. REv. 1859, 1872 (1996) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984». Given the deference 
found at the judicial level, the best opportunity to participate in or challenge a 
proposed timber sale usually occurs at the administrative level. [d. at 1872. The 
rider, however, prohibits administrative review of salvage timber and Option 9 
sales and thus forces challengers into the judicial arena where the only standard 
of review available is "arbitrary and capricious." § 1611(e), (0(4). Unfortunately, it 
is unlikely that challengers will succeed under arbitrary and capricious review be-
cause a court must find the decision arbitrary and capricious in relation to an ex-
isting legal standard. Dorn, supra note 9, at 471. Section 1611(i) arguably removes 
all existing legal standards, leaving a court with nothing against which to measure 
the lawfulness of the agency action. [d. at 472; see § 1611(i). 
47. § 1611(0(1}-(7). 
48. § 1611(0(1). 
49. § 1611(0(3). In effect, this provision means that by the time a judge issues 
a final order determining the legality of a sale, the trees may already be logged. 
Dorn, .supra note 9, at 468. 
50. § 1611(0(4). 
51. See supra note 46. 
52. See § 1611(i). 
9
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b. The Effect of Other Laws on Salvage Timber and Option 9 
Sales 
The most controversial prOVISIOn contained in the Act is 
§ 1611(i) entitled "[e]ffect on other laws[.ra Section 1611(i) 
states "[t]he documents and procedures required by this section 
for the preparation, advertisement, offering, awarding and 
operation of any [salvage timber and Option 9 sale] shall be 
deemed to satisfy the requirements of the following applicable 
federal laws (and regulations implementing such laws):" 1) the 
Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 
1974 (FRRRPA);54 2) the Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act of 1976 (FLPMA);55 3) the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA);56 4) the Endangered Species Act of 
1973 (ESA);57 5) the National Forest Management Act of 1976 
(NFMA);58 6) the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 
53. § 1611(i). This section has also been called the "sufficiency clause." Dorn, 
supra note 9, at 467. 
54. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-1687 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996). 
55. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1784 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996). 
56. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370d (West 1994 & Supp. 1996). In the context of 
forest management, NEPA requires that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
be prepared for timber sales in excess of one million board feet when such sales 
would significantly affect the quality of the human environment. § 4332(C); 40 
C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1996); see The Found. for Global Sustainability Inc.'s Forest Pro-
tection and Biodiversity Project v. McConnell, No. 2:93CV69, 1993 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11207, at *4 (W.O. N.C. June 2, 1993) (stating "salvage which removes 
1,000,000 board feet or less of merchantable wood products and which requires one 
mile or less of low standard road construction has no significant impact on the 
human environment, and therefore may be categorically excluded from those pro-
jects requiring an EA or an EIS"). An EIS must also discuss possible impacts and 
assess viable alternatives. Kakuske, supra note 46, at 1870. In addition, 
[i]n the context of public participation, NEPA plays two 
critical roles. First, because an EIS contains a legal suffi-
ciency requirement, it provides the public with an oppor-
tunity to challenge either the absence or inadequacy of 
the EIS in court. . . . Second, and most importantly, 
NEPA provides for extensive public involvement in the 
preparation, scope and review of the EIS. 
[d. (citations omitted). 
NEPA's public involvement and information disclosure requirements allow 
the public to apply political pressure to poorly conceived timber sales. [d. at 1871. 
This type of pressure has proven to be very successful and, as a result, has moti-
vated state public disclosure laws such as California's Proposition 65. [d. 
57. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996). 
58. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 472a-545a (West 1985 & Supp. 1996). NFMA's timber har-
10
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(MUSy);59 7) any compact, executive agreement, convention, 
treaty, and international agreement, and implementing legisla-
tion; and 8) all other applicable federal environmental and 
natural resource laws. 60 
3. Section 318 Sales 
The third and final category of timber sales authorized by 
the salvage logging rider involves sales offered or awarded 
before the rider's date of enactment in any unit of the National 
Forest System or district of the BLM subject to section 318 of 
Public Law 101-121.61 "Notwithstanding any other provision 
vest provisions reduce the area from which the Forest Service may legally autho-
rize timber sales. Dorn, supra note 9, at 457. NFMA forbids harvests on lands 
1) designated as "marginal," 2) where logging would destroy biological diversity, 
3) where watersheds cannot be protected, and 4) where the costs of the sale ex-
ceed revenues. [d. In addition, the amount harvested cannot exceed the amount 
which can be removed "annually in perpetuity on a sustained-yield basis." [d. at 
457-58. Finally, although the Act does not forbid clearcuts, it restricts their size 
and provides that they must be "the optimum method . . . to meet the objectives 
and requirements of the relevant land management plan." [d. at 458. 
59. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 528-531 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996). 
60. § 1611(i) (emphasis added). 
61. § 1611(k)(1). To date, this provision of the rider has received the most 
attention in court. Axline, supra note 4, at 634. This can be attributed, in part, to 
the fact that much of the section 318 timber is located in habitat which is critical-
ly important to threatened or endangered species. [d. at 614 n. 11. Prior to 1990, 
court orders prohibited logging in these areas, due to the presence of the northern 
spotted owl. [d. Then, in 1990, a rider attached to an appropriations bill removed 
the courts' jurisdiction. [d.; see Department of Interior and Related Agencies Ap-
propriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 318(0(1), 103 Stat. 701, 749 (1989). 
That rider, formally entitled the Northwest Timber Compromise of 1989, is com-
monly referred to as "section 318." Dorn, supra note 9, at 472 n.189. 
Section 318 mandated "aggregate timber sale levels" for timber harvests cut 
from National Forest Service and BLM lands in Oregon and Washington during 
fiscal years 1989 and 1990. § 318. The aggregate timber sale level for the Forest 
Service waR seven billion seven hundred million board feet of net merchantable 
timber, of which five billion eight hundred million was to come from the thirteen 
national forests in Oregon and Washington known to contain northern spotted 
owls. § 318(a)(1). From its administrative districts in Western Oregon, the BLM 
was required to meet an aggregate timber sale level of one billion nine hundred 
million board feet. § 318(a)(2). A board foot is an industry unit of measure equal 
to the cubic contents of a piece of lumber 12" x 12" x 1". WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 244 (1993). 
Section 318 reduced the amount of timber that the Forest Service and the 
BLM had to sell from ten billion board feet to 9.6 billion board feet of net mer-
chantable timber. Bolduan, supra note 4, at 383. The rider provided for one level 
of administrative review, as well as expedited judicial review. [d. at 384. Section 
318 prohibited restraining orders or preliminary injunctions, but provided for per-
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of law," these sales must be awarded "with no change in origi-
nally advertised terms, volumes, and bid prices.,,62 Although 
the rider states that section 318 sales will not be released if 
any threatened or endangered bird species is known to be 
nesting within the acreage that is the subject of the sale unit, 
it also provides that, should this be the case, the Secretaries 
must provide the purchaser with an equal volume of timber, of 
like kind and value, and subject to the terms of the original 
contract.63 
B. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION ON THE RESCIS-
SIONS ACT 
Upon signing the Rescissions Act into law, President 
Clinton stated: 
To be sure, I do not support every provision of 
this bill. For instance, I still do not believe that 
this bill should contain any of the provisions 
relating to timber. But, the final bill does con-
tain changes in the language that preserve our 
ability to implement the current forest plans 
and their standards, and protect other resources 
such as clean water and fisheries. . .. I have 
directed the Secretaries of the Interior, Agricul-
ture, Commerce, the Administrator of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, and other Federal 
agencies to carry out timber salvage activities 
consistent with our forest plans and existing 
environmentallaws.64 
manent injunctions if, after a trial on the merits, a court detennined the sale was 
arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with the law. [d. 
Implementation of Section 318 was delayed by several lawsuits. Northwest 
Forest Resource Council, 82 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). The constitutionality of 
section 318 was challenged and upheld in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 
U.S. 429 (1992). [d. at 829 n.3. Allegations of noncompliance with the terms of 
section 318 were litigated in Seattle Audubon Society v. Robertson, Civ. Nos. 89-
160, 89-99 (W.D. Wash. March 7, 1991). [d. In addition there were various chal-
lenges to section 318 sales based on the Endangered Species Act. [d. Eventually, 
section 318 resulted in a number of timber sales that were offered but then with-
drawn when it was discovered that an additional threatened species, the marbled 
murrelet, also relied on the habitat that would be destroyed by the sales. Axline, 
supra note 4, at 614 n.11. 
62. § 1611(k)(1). 
63. § 1611(k)(2),(3). 
64. Statements by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 1944, 31 
12
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The directive referred to in the President's statement re-
sulted in an interagency Memorandum of Agreement in which 
the Secretaries and the Administrator agreed to "comply with 
previously existing environmental laws except where expressly 
prohibited by [the Rescissions Act.r5 This Memorandum of 
Agreement only applied to salvage sales however, and it was 
not enforceable at law.66 
The deluge of lawsuits began almost immediately after the 
President signed the Act into law.67 The first action was 
brought by the timber industry, which sought a clarification of 
the scope of sales affected by the phrase "subject to section 
318," found in § 1611(k)(1) of the rider.68 The district court's 
decision in that case, and the Ninth Circuit's subsequent deni-
al of an emergency motion for an injunction pending the ap-
peal of that decision, prompted the following statement from 
the President: "My administration's agreement with Congress 
on this issue was significantly different from the interpretation 
upheld this week by the courts .... My administration will ac-
tively pursue a legislative remedy to correct this extreme re-
sult.,,69 Subsequently, on February 24, 1996, the President 
called for a repeal of the salvage logging rider.70 
Most recently, Vice President Gore summarized the 
Administration's position by stating that signing the salvage 
logging rider 
was, indeed, our biggest mistake and it never 
WEEKLY COMPo PREs. Doc. 1377 (Aug. 7, 1995). See infra note 224. 
65. See infra note 225. 
66. In the summer of 1996, an objective review of compliance with the Memo-
randum of Agreement was conducted by representatives of the Forest Service, the 
Bureau of Land Management, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Fish and 
Wildlife Service, the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget. For the results of this review, see Department of Agriculture, 
Administration Releases Review of Activities Conducted Under Salvage Rider, Re-
lease No. 0629.96 (Dec. 6, 1996) (available through the Federal Document Clearing 
House, Inc.) 
67. See infra Parts II.C., VII. 
68. Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, No. 95-6244-HO, 1995 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13300 (D. Or. Sept. 8, 1995). 
69. Axline, supra note 4, at 635-637. 
70. James Gerstenzang, Clinton Backs Repeal of Logging Provision, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 25, 1996, at A16. 
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would have happened except for a miscalculation 
on our part about the magnitude of what was 
wrong with the provision. We were genuinely 
surprised. .. by the court decision[s] which 
vastly expanded the scope of something we 
thought could be muted by administrative ac-
tion. We knew it was not good policy. But it was 
[an] example[] of one thing imbedded in a huge, 
overall measure that had to pass.71 
[Vol. 27:1 
C. NINTH CIRCmT DECISIONS TO DATE INTERPRETING THE 
RESCISSIONS ACT 
To date, most of the prOVISIOns of the rider have been 
litigated.72 In its decisions, the Ninth Circuit has ruled almost 
exclusively in favor of the timber industry, upholding broad 
Forest Service discretion and refusing to limit the rider's 
scope.73 
1. Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman 
Section 318 sales were the subject of the first Ninth Cir-
cuit decision interpreting the provisions of the Rescissions Act. 
In Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman,74 the court 
was asked to define the categories of timber sales the Secretar-
ies were required to release pursuant to § 1611(k)(1).75 The 
71. John H. Cushman, Jr. & Timothy Egan, Battles on Conservation Are 
Reaping Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1996, at AI. 
72. See infra Parts II.C., VII. 
73. Dorn, supra note 9, at 482. 
74. 82 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996) (NFRC). 
75. Id. at 828. § 1611(k)(1) states: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, within 45 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act [July 27, 
1995], the Secretary concerned shall act to award, release, 
and permit to be completed in fiscal years 1995 and 1996, 
with no change in originally advertised terms, volumes, 
and bid prices, all timber sale contracts offered or award-
ed before that date in any unit of the National Forest 
System or district of the Bureau of Land Management 
subject to section 318 of Public Law 101-121 (l03 Stat. 
745)[.] 
§ 1611(k)(l) (emphasis added). 
14
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Northwest Forest Resource Council (NFRC)76 argued that the 
phrase "subject to section 318," contained in § 1611(k)(1), de-
scribed only section 318's geographical boundaries, but did not 
include its chronological limits.77 According to NFRC's inter-
pretation, § 1611(k)(1) required the Secretaries to release not 
only the sales that had occurred in fiscal years 1989 and 1990, 
but all subsequent sales occurring through the enactment of 
the Rescissions Act in July, 1995.78 In contrast, the Secretar-
ies argued that the reference to section 318 imposed both geo-
graphical and temporal limits on the scope of § 1611(k)(1), 
thus limiting the releases to those sales which occurred in 
fiscal years 1989 and 1990.79 
Based on the structure of § 1611(k)(1), the plain and ordi-
nary meaning of the words it contained and severallong-stand-
ing principles of statutory interpretation, the court concluded 
that the language of § 1611(k)(1) was clear and that the phrase 
"subject to section 318" defined only the geographical reach of 
the statute.80 The Ninth Circuit affirmed both the district 
court's order adopting NFRC's interpretation of § 1611(k)(1) 
and its permanent injunction directing the Secretaries to re-
lease all timber sale contracts offered or awarded between 
October 1, 1990 and July 27, 1995.81 
A devastating blow to environmentalists, the case did not 
end with the clarification of the scope of section 318 sales. 
NFRC was in fact a consolidation of two cases arising out of 
76. NFRC is a timber industry trade association. NFRC, 82 F.3d at 828. 
77. [d. at 829. Section 318's geographical boundaries included "the national 
forests of Oregon and Washington ... [and the BLM] administrative districts in 
western Oregon." § 318(a)(1), (2). The section specifically exempted certain portions 
of those areas containing northern spotted owls. § 318(b)(3), (5). Section 318 was 
limited chronologically to "fiscal years 1989 and 1990." § 318(a)(1), (2). 
78. NFRC, 82 F.3d at 829-830. Amazingly, the timber industry originally 
sought the release of every timber sale ever offered, in the states of Oregon and 
Washington, from the creation of the national forest system in 1891 until the 
enactment of the Act in 1995. See Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 
No. 95-6244, 1955 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13300 (D. Or. Sept. 13, 1995). 
79. NFRC, 82 F.3d at 831. Under the Secretaries' interpretation, they were re-
quired to release an estimated 410 million board feet of net merchantable timber. 
[d. at 828. NFRC's interpretation would require the release of an additional 246 
million board feet, or a total of 656 million board feet. [d. 
80. [d. at 834. 
81. [d. at 839. 
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the same set of events.S2 In the second appeal, Oregon Natu-
ral Resources Council and several other environmental organi-
zations (collectively ONRC) challenged the district court's re-
fusal to allow their intervention in NFRC's lawsuit against the 
Secretaries. 53 NFRC opposed ONRC's motion to intervene ar-
guing that ONRC's interests in the enforcement of environ-
mental laws were irrelevant because § 1611(k)(1) nullified 
those laws.84 The Ninth Circuit held that ONRC had not dem-
onstrated a "significantly protectable interest" in the lawsuit to 
merit intervention because § 1611(k)(1), with its phrase "not-
withstanding any other provision of law," explicitly preempted 
the environmental laws ONRC sought to protect.85 
2. Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. Glickman 
Almost immediately after issuing its decision in NFRC, the 
Ninth Circuit confirmed precisely how deferential arbitrary 
and capricious review could be in a case involving salvage 
timber sales.86 In Inland Empire, the Inland Empire Public 
Lands Council (the Council) filed an action seeking a perma-
nent injunction prohibiting the Secretary from proceeding with 
salvage timber sales of approximately 36 million board feet in 
the Kootenai National Forest in northwest Montana.87 The 
Forest Service was conducting these sales pursuant to the 
provisions contained in the Rescissions Act and had prepared 
Biological Assessments (BAs) as required by that Act.88 The 
BAs concluded that the sales were not likely to adversely affect 
the CabineVY aak Ecosystem grizzly bear, a threatened species 
under the ESA.89 The Council argued that the agency's deci-
sion was arbitrary and capricious because the Forest Service's 
82. [d. at 828. 
83. [d. 
84. NFRC, 82 F.3d at 830 n.5. NFRC opposed ONRC's motion to intervene for· 
two additional reasons: NFRC claimed that (1) ONRC's interests would not be 
impaired by the lawsuit; and (2) ONRC's interests would be adequately represent-
ed by the Secretaries. [d. 
85. [d. at 837. In effect, this decision mandates the same results for section 
318 sales as the sufficiency clause does for salvage timber and Option 9 sales. 
86. See Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Glickman, 88 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 
1996) (Inland Empire). 
87. [d. at 700. 
88. [d. See § 16U(c)(1)(A). 
89. [d. 
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new 'core area strategy' would inadequately protect the grizzly 
bear population.90 In upholding the agency's decision, the 
Ninth Circuit unequivocally stated that, under the Rescissions 
Act, "[ t]he Forest Service did not need to consider the effect on 
the grizzly bear. . . . [It] had discretion to disregard entirely 
the effect on the grizzly bear.',gl 
The Council also argued that 1) the Forest Service had 
failed to rationalize its change in bear protection policy, and 
2) the core area strategy did not incorporate all of the specific 
recommendations of the Interagency Grizzly Bear Committee 
Taskforce Report, upon which the Forest Service relied.92 The 
Ninth Circuit dismissed both of those arguments. First, the 
court found that the Forest Service's explanation, that recent 
fires had triggered the new policy, was sufficient.93 Second, 
the court determined that § 1611(c)(1) gave the Secretary the 
sole discretion over the information considered to reach a deci-
sion, and the sole discretion to determine whether that decision 
complied with existing applicable forest management plans 
and guidelines.94 
Alternatively, the Council argued that the "sole discretion" 
language contained in § 1611(c)(1) required the Secretary of 
Agriculture to personally authorize all salvage timber sales.95 
Disagreeing, the Ninth Circuit noted that Secretary Glickman 
had followed the delegation procedures which the Secretary of 
90. Id. at 701. Specifically, the core area strategy "1) appl[iedl the road densi-
ty limitation only to each Bear Management Unit, rather than to each smaller 
Bear Analysis Area, 2) allow[edl exceptions to the forty-acre opening size and 600-
foot movement corridor restrictions, and 3) allow[edl exceptions to the seventy-
percent habitat effectiveness standard." Id. 
91. Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 701 (emphasis added). The Court also reiterated 
that the Rescissions Act provided for extremely limited judicial review. Id. Review 
of salvage timber sales is thus limited, the court stated, in that "(1) review is 
based on the administrative record only; (2) the standard of review is arbitrary 
and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with applicable law; and (3) the sale 
is not subject to any federal environmental or natural resources laws." [d. (quoting 
Kentucky Heartwood, Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 906 F. Supp. 410, 412 
(E.D. Ky. 1995». 
92. [d. at 702. 
93. Id. In August 1994, a lightning storm ignited over 200 flres in the 
Kootenai National Forest. [d. at 700. Fifty-five thousand acres were burned. [d. 
94. Id. at 702. 
95. Id. In this case, the sales had been authorized by the Chief of the United 
States Forest Service, Jack Ward Thomas. 
17
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Agriculture traditionally used, and that requiring the Secre-
tary to personally authorize every salvage timber sale would 
contradict the stated purpose of the Rescissions Act, which was 
to expedite such sales.96 
Finally, the Council argued that the district court improp-
erly struck several extra-record materials.97 In response, the 
Ninth Circuit stressed that § 1611(f)(4) of the Rescissions Act 
limited judicial review "to a review of the record."98 Therefore, 
unless one of the recognized exceptions was present, extra-
record materials would not be considered.99 
3. Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Pilchuck Audubon 
Society 
Finding their attacks on individual provisions of the rider 
to be ineffective, environmentalists shifted their focus to the 
constitutionality of the statute as a whole. The question of 
whether the provisions of the rider were constitutional was 
addressed in Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Pilchuck 
Audubon Society.lOo In Pilchuck, there were in fact five issues 
before the court. 101 The district court had held that 1) the 
provisions of the rider were constitutional, 2) the rider applied 
to timber sales enjoined or canceled prior to its passage, 
3) timber sales offered in violation of their authorizing statutes 
were within the scope of § 1611(k)(1),102 4) the rider required 
96. Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 702. 
97. Id. Specifically, "the district court struck two expert declarations regarding 
grizzly bear survival, four Forest Service and FWS documents and two papers on 
grizzly bear management, upon which the Forest Service did not rely, and several 
FWS documents upon which FWS relied in reaching its concurrence." Id. 
98. Id. The court also stated that the Ninth Circuit would only consider extra-
record materials when (1) they were necessary to determine whether the agency 
has considered all relevant factors and had explained its decision, (2) the agency 
had relied on documents not in the record, (3) supplementing the record was nec-
essary to explain technical terms or complex subject matter, or (4) plaintiffs made 
a showing of agency bad faith. Id. at 703-04. 
99. Id. 
100. 97 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1996) (Pilchuck). 
101. Id. at 1162. 
102. The section directs: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, within 45 
days after the date of enactment of this act [July 27, 
19951, the Secretary concerned shall act to award, release, 
18
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the sales to be reoffered to all previous bidders, and 5) the 
Secretaries use of PSG protocoP03 to determine when marbled 
murrelets were "known to be nesting" violated the rider's pro-
visions. 104 
First, appellants argued that the rider was unconstitution-
al because it violated the separation of powers doctrine by 
permitting Congress to resurrect sales that had been enjoined 
by federal courtS.105 The Ninth Circuit quickly disposed of 
this argument stating that the rider would only violate the 
separation of powers doctrine if it directed certain findings in 
pending litigation without changing any underlying law. lOS 
The Ninth Circuit found that the lower court had correctly 
applied the test stated in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 
and therefore the rider was constitutional. 107 
The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court's ruling 
and pennit to be completed in fiscal years 1995 and 1996, 
with no change in originally advertised terms, volumes, 
and bid prices, all timber sale contracts offered or award-
ed before that date in any unit of the National Forest 
System or district of the Bureau of Land Management 
subject to section 318 of Public Law 101-121 (103 Stat. 
745) [not classified to the Code1- ... " 
§ 1611(k}(1} (emphasis added). 
103. The PSG Protocol is the scientifically accepted method of detennining the 
"presence or probable absence" of marbled murre lets in a particular forest stand. 
Pilchuck, 97 F.3d at 1167 (citing Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 880 F. 
Supp. 1343 (N.D. Cal. 1995)}. Listed as a threatened species since 1992, the mar-
bled murrelet is prone to elusive behavior which makes it extremely difficult to 
detennine when it is nesting based purely on physical evidence. [d. at 1169. Using 
the Protocol, a stand of trees is detennined to be a nesting stand based on a sta-
tistical analysis involving such evidence as: "(1) detection of an active nest or re-
cent nest by a fecal ring or eggshell fragments; (2) . . . birds flying in, out or 
through the canopy; or (3) birds circling directly over or under the canopy." [d. 
104. [d. at 1164. According to § 1611(k}(2}, "[nlo sale unit shall be released or 
completed under this subsection if any threatened or endangered bird species is 
known to be nesting within the acreage that is the subject of the sale unit." 
§ 1611(k}(2} (emphasis added). Other than the "known to be nesting" language, 
Congress provided no guidance for detennining which timber sales were exempt 
from § 1611(k}(2} and compensated for under § 1611(k}(3}. Pilchuck, 97 F.3d at 
1168. 
105. Pilchuck, 97 F.3d at 1165. 
106. [d. 
107. [d. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (holding 
that section 318 "compelled changes in the law, not results under old law," thus it 
did not violate the separation of powers doctrine). . 
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that the rider applied to all previously enjoined or canceled 
timber sales, but reversed the determination that sales offered 
in violation of their authorizing statutes were also within the 
scope of the rider. lOS The court stated that, while it could find 
nothing in § 1611(k)(1) that would make a valid sale out of a 
sale which was not valid under its authorizing statute, the 
definition of the word "offered" combined with the plain lan-
guage of the rider could not exclude the release of validly of-
fered sales that were subsequently enjoined or canceled. I09 
Next, the Ninth Circuit examined the Secretaries argu-
ment that § 1611(k)(1) did not require them to seek out unsuc-
cessful bidders in cases where the original high bidders were 
unwilling, unable, or unqualified to take advantage of the 
renewed offer. l1O The court noted that both the Forest Service 
and the BLM had statutes and regulations which gave them 
the discretion to refuse to award a sale where the high bidder 
was ineligible. 111 The court then stated its unwillingness to 
find an implied repeal of those statutes and regulations, partic-
ularly when that repeal would be based on an appropriations 
act, and reversed the determination of the lower court. 112 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit also reversed the lower court's 
determination that the Secretaries' use of the PSG protocol 
violated .the provisions of the rider.113 The Secretaries argued 
that the PSG protocol was consistent with § 1611(k)(1)'s re-
quirements. ll4 The timber industry insisted, however, that a 
"known to be nesting" determination could only be based on 
physical evidence.115 The district court rejected both parties' 
arguments and formulated its own interpretation of "known to 
be nesting."l1s The Ninth Circuit began by noting that the 
rider itself was ambiguous. 117 In addition, the legislative his-
108. Pilchuck, 97 F.3d at 1164. 




113. Pilchuck, 97 F.3d at 1170. 
114. [d. at 1168. See supra note 102-03. 
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tory was not helpful because the rider had not been reviewed 
by a committee. U8 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the dis-
trict court had erred by not deferring to the Secretaries' inter-
pretation, that interpretation being reasonable based on the 
language of the rider and the time frame for implementa-
tion.u9 
The decisions in NFRC, Inland Empire and Pilchuck set 
the stage for the sweeping interpretation of § 1611(i) and its 
effect on Option 9 sales that followed in Oregon Natural Re-
sources Council v. Thomas. 120 For the fourth time, the deci-
sion was a victory for the timber industry. 
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In ONRC II, two environmental organizations, the Oregon 
Natural Resources Council and Umpqua Watersheds, Inc. 
(collectively ONRC), tried to block four timber sales by Jack 
Ward Thomas, Chief of the United States Forest Service. 121 
The four challenged sales were the Roughneck, Watchdog, 
Pinestrip, and Snog sales.122 The Ninth Circuit only consid-
ered ONRC's claims against the latter two sales. 123 The 
Pinestrip and Snog sales were located in the Upper North 
Umpqua River Basin in southwestern Oregon, over 30 miles of 
118. [d. at 1167. 
119. [d. at 1168-1170. 
120. 92 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 1996) (ONRC Il) (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
121. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 794 (9thCir. 
1996) (ONRC Il) (Reinhardt, J., concurring). In Inland Empire Public Lands Coun· 
cil v. Glickman, 88 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 1996), the Court upheld Chief Thomas' 
authority to sell timber as the subdelegatee of the Secretary of Agriculture. [d. at 
794 n.l. See supra Part II.C.2. 
122. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, No. 95-6272-HO 1995 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 19567, at *2 (D. Or. filed Dec. 5, 1995) (ONRC). The Roughneck and 
Watchdog sales were awarded in 1994, before the enactment of the Rescissions 
Act. [d. The Pinestrip and Snog sales were advertised and offered after the date 
of enactment. [d. ONRC's challenge to the Roughneck and Watchdog sales was 
effectively resolved against them by the Ninth Circuit Court's decision in North· 
west Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding 
the phrase "subject to section 318" in § 1611(k)(1) of the 1995 Rescissions Act in· 
clud~d only section 318's geographical limits, not its chronological limits, thereby 
authorizing timber sales offered or awarded after fiscal years 1989 and 1990 
through the enactment of the Rescissions Act). ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 794. See suo 
pra Part I1.C.l. 
123. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 794. 
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which had been designated as wild and scenic river. 124 In ad-
dition, these sales also involved timber growing on land subject 
to President Clinton's Northwest Forest Plan, commonly re-
ferred to as Option 9.125 
ONRC argued that the Pinestrip and Snog sales would 
degrade aquatic resources and reduce viable populations of 
native aquatic and amphibious species in violation of the Na-
tional Forest Management Act (NFMA).126 In addition, ONRC 
alleged that the sales did not comply with Option 9, which was 
binding on the Forest Service under NFMA.127 Finally, ONRC 
maintained that the sales were "arbitrary and capricious" un-
der Administrative Procedure Act (APA) § 706(2)(A) for three 
reasons. 12S First, the Forest Service did not obtain informa-
124. [d. Congress has declared "that certain selected rivers of the Nation which, 
with their immediate environments, possess outstandingly remarkable scenic, recre-
ational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values, shall 
be preserved in free-flowing condition, and that they and their immediate environ-
ments shall be protected for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future genera-
tions." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1271 (West 1985) (emphasis added). See 16 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1274(a)(95) (West Supp. 1996) (designating "[t]he 33.8-mile segment from the 
Soda Springs Powerhouse to Rock Creek in the following classes: (A) [t]he 25.4-
mile segment from the Soda Springs Powerhouse to the Umpqua National Forest 
boundary as a recreational river; to be administered by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture; and (B) the 8.4-mile segment from the Umpqua National Forest boundary to 
its confluence with Rock Creek as a recreational river; to be administered by the 
Secretary of the Interior."). 
125. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 794. See supra note 44. 
126. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 794. See National Forest Management Act, 16 
U.S.C.A. § 1604(g)(3) (West 1985); 36 C.F.R. § 219 et seq. (1996). Section 1604 (g) 
directs the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations that set out the 
process for the development and revision of land management plans, guidelines 
and standards prescribed by the Act. § 1604(g). "The regulations shall include ... 
(3) specifying guidelines for land management plans developed to achieve the goals 
of the Program which . . . (B) provide for the diversity of plant and animal com-
munities based on the suitability and capability of the specific land area in order 
to meet overall multiple-use objectives, ... (C) insure research on and ... evalu-
ation of the effects of each management system to the end that it will not produce 
substantial and permanent impairment of the productivity of the land[.l" 
§ 1604(g)(3)(B), (C). 
127. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 794-95. Specifically, ONRC alleged a violation of 16 
U.S.C.A. § 1604(i) and 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(e). Section 1604(i) states, in part, 
"[r]esource plans and permits, contracts, and other instruments for the use and 
occupancy of National Forest System lands shall be consistent with the land ~an­
agement plans." § 1604(i). 
128. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 795. Section 706 is entitled the "scope of review." 5 
U.S.C.A. § 706 (West 1996). It states "[t]o the extent necessary to decision and 
when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, in-
terpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or ap-
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tion necessary to ensure a) that the sales would not affect the 
maintenance of viable populations of aquatic and amphibious 
species, and b) that the sales would not seriously, adversely 
affect the watershed. 129 Second, the Forest Service found that 
the sales would not have a significant environmental impact 
despite evidence to the contrary by its own experts. 130 Final-
ly, the Forest Service failed to complete mitigation measures it 
committed to in connection with the sales. 131 
The district court dismissed ONRC's case based on the 
provisions of the salvage rider contained in the 1995 Rescis-
sions Act and the APA.132 ONRC appealed this decision to the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 133 The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court's decision concluding that Option 9 sales, 
pursuant to the rider, were not subject to federal environmen-
tal and resource law challenges and that there could be no 
"arbitrary and capricious" review under AP A § 706(2)(A) inde-
pendent of another statute.134 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In deciding whether review of Option 9 timber sales was 
available under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Ninth 
Circuit began by looking at the section of the rider entitled 
"Effect on other laws.,,135 The court noted that the effect of 
the plain language of § 1611(i) was to render sufficient, under 
the environmental laws, any documents and procedures the 
plicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall . . . (2) hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law[.]" § 706(2)(A). 
129. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 795 (citing CR 23 'II 17.-d). ONRC did not allege that 
any statute other than the APA required the Forest Service to obtain this infor-
mation.ld. 
130. Id. (citing Opening Br. of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 25-26). 
131. Id. (citing Opening Br. of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 26-27). 
132. Id.; ONRC, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19567. 
133. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 795. 
134. Id. at 796, 797 n.10. In ONRC II, Judge Reinhardt wrote a concurring 
opinion declining to decide whether there can ever be a violation of the APA in 
the absence of an independent statute that supports the violation. ONRC II, 92 
F.3d at 799. 
135. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 
1996) (ONRC II) (Reinhardt, J., concurring); § 1611(i); see supra Part II.A.2.b. 
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agency elected to use for an Option 9 sale. 136 As a result, 
ONRC's challenges to the sales based on NFMA and its imple-
menting regulations failed. 137 The court rejected ONRC's ar-
gument that legal sufficiency should only be extended to docu-
ments and procedures used to "prepare, offer and award" sales, 
but not to those underlying an agency's decision to "operate" a 
sale/3S noting that the language of § 1611(i) explicitlyextend-
ed legal sufficiency to documents and procedures underlying an 
agency's decision to operate a sale. 139 Furthermore, "allowing 
environmentally-based challenges to the operation of Option 9 
sales would frustrate one of the rider's primary purposes: to 
enable the logging of timber on Option 9 land."l40 
The court then considered "the overriding thrust" of 
ONRC's case. 141 ONRC argued that the Pinestrip and Snog 
sales were "arbitrary and capricious" under APA § 706(2)(A), 
even assuming no other law applied. 142 In affirming the 
district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit looked not to 
§ 706(2)(A), but to § 701(a)(2).143 The latter section forbids 
judicial review of agency action "to the extent that . . . agency 
action is committed to agency discretion by law."l44 The court 
explained that "the AP A is merely a vehicle for carrying sub-
stantive challenges to court. "145 As ONRC could not point to 
any independent, substantive body of law that confined the 
Forest Service's discretion to go forward with the sales, their 
decision to sell the timber was committed to agency discretion 
under § 701(a)(2) and therefore, not reviewable. l46 
136. ONRe II, 92 F.3d at 795. 
137. Id. at 796. 
138. Id. at 795-96 n.7. The premise was that ONRC was challenging the "opera-
tion" of the sales, and not the administrative decision to offer and award the 
sales. ONRe, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19567, at *6. 
139. "The documents and procedures required by this section for the prepara-
tion, advertisement, offering, awarding, and operation of any timber sale under 
subsection (d) shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of the following .... " 
§ 1611(i) (enphasis added). 
140. ONRe II, 92 F.3d at 795-796 n.7. 
141. Id. at 796. 
142. Id. For the language of § 706(2)(A), see supra note 128. 
143. ONRe II, 92 F.3d at 796. 
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ONRC then argued that the court's analysis rendered 
meaningless § 1611(0 of the rider to the extent that it provided 
for judicial review. 147 Disagreeing, the court stated that 
ONRC would only be correct if the rider insulated Option 9 
sales from any judicial scrutiny.l4S Since § 1611(i) only ex-
tended legal sufficiency to documents and procedures for Op-
tion 9 sales under federal environmental and natural resource 
laws, it did not foreclose challenges based on other laws.149 
The Ninth Circuit also agreed with the district court that the 
best interpretation of § 1611(d),s requirement to expedite the 
preparation, offer and award of Option 9 sales 
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law" required the 
disregard of environmental laws only, not all laws otherwise 
applicable to Option 9 sales.150 The court pointed out that 
language located elsewhere in the statute also suggested that 
this was Congress' intent. 151 
ONRC also argued that § 1611(0(4) supported the idea 
that review under the APA was consistent with. the rider's 
suspension of federal environmental and natural resource laws 
because it allowed a court to prevent a salvage timber sale if it 
determined that "the decision to prepare, offer, award or oper-
ate the sale was arbitrary and capricious[.],,152 In response, 
the Ninth Circuit reiterated that § 706(2)(A) only provided the 
standard to be applied on review, but before a party could 
147. [d. Section 1611(0(1) states that salvage timber and Option 9 sales are 
subject to judicial review only in a United States district court for the district in 
which the affected Federal lands are located, and only if such a challenge is filed 
within 15 days after the date of initial advertisement of the challenged sale. § 
1611(0(1). 
148. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 796. 
149. [d. The defendant intervenors suggested that "challenges would still be 
available based on federal contracting laws, such as ... a claim alleging a failure 
to include required labor or non-discrimination provisions in a contract, a claim for 
violations of log export restrictions, small business set-aside provisions . . . and 
other non-environmental laws." [d. (citing Opposition Br. of Defendant-Intervenor 
Appellees at 15.) 
150. [d. Citing several examples, the Court stated that it had repeatedly found 
that the phrase "notwithstanding the provisions of any other law" is not always 
construed literally. [d. It should be noted, however, that this interpretation ren-
ders the sufficiency clause in 1611(i), specifically 1611(i)(8), duplicative, contradict-
ing a long standing principle of statutory interpretation: that sections of a statute 
should be read to give effect, if possible, to every clause. 
151. [d. at 797; see § 1611(0(4). 
152. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 797. See § 1611(0(4). 
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obtain any such review, it would first have to clear the § 701(a) 
hurdle. 153 
Finally, ONRC contended that decisions to sell Option 9 
timber were not committed to agency discretion because they 
were "typically well-suited to judicial review" and they "tradi-
tionally ha[d] been reviewable."lM Although the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged that those were relevant considerations in a 
§ 701(a)(2) analysis/55 the court restated its position that re-
view under § 701(a)(2) was dependent upon whether there was 
a law to apply.156 In this case, there simply was no underly-
ing law. 
V. CRITIQUE 
It would be difficult to claim that any of the Ninth Circuit 
Court's decisions interpreting the rider were incorrect. The 
plain language of the statute does indeed support most of those 
decisions. But there is a more fundamental level upon which 
the wisdom of those decisions should be measured. The mem-
bers of Congress represent the people of the United States. 
Yet, the passage of the salvage rider ran contrary to the ex-
press will of those people. This is evidenced by the more than 
sixty thousand communications, including letters, faxes, e-mail 
messages and phone calls, the White House received asking 
President Clinton to veto the bill based on its inclusion of the 
salvage logging· rider.157 The President also received almost 
1000 pieces of wood carrying similar messages. 15S On the day 
he signed the Rescissions Act into law, the President received 
an additional 350,000 petitions from Americans demanding 
that U.S. forests, wilderness and other public lands be protect-
153. ONRC II, 92 F.3d at 797 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 
(1985)). 
154. Id. at 798 (citing Opening Br. of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 22). 
155. Id. (citing Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1994». 
156. Id. (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 
(1971». 
157. Environmental Groups Blast President Clinton for Signing Timber Rider; 
Hold '21 Chainsaw Salute' in Front of the White House, U.S. NEWSWIRE, July 28, 
1995 [hereinafter Environmental Groups Blast Clinton]. 
158. Id. 
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ed. IS9 Subsequently, a recent poll reported that 74 percent of 
Americans are opposed to the salvage rider. 160 The executive 
director of the American Ocean Campaign aptly stated, "[i]t is 
disturbing that the voices of thousands of Americans . . . will 
be muted by the sickening roar of chainsaws in our national 
forests."161 Clearly, Congress failed to act in accordance with 
the will of the people when it passed the Rescissions Act. 
A. THE PROHIBITION ON RIDERS 
Lack of public support for the salvage rider aside, there 
are several other reasons why it should be invalidated. First 
and foremost, both the House of Representatives and the Sen-
ate have rules prohibiting the attachment of substantive provi-
sions to spending bills. 162 The House Rules prohibit any 
amendment to a general appropriation if it changes existing 
law. l63 Similarly, the Senate Rules prohibit the Committee on 
Appropriations from reporting an appropriations bill that con-
tains amendments which propose new or general legisla-
tion. l64 Attaching the Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Pro-
gram to the 1995 Rescissions Act clearly violated the rules of 
both Houses. lss Nonetheless, the rider's sponsors were able to 
use their positions to influence other members of Congress to 
waive the House rules prohibiting such riders.l66 The Senate 
159. [d. 
160. Dorn, supra note 9, at 481 (citing Brian Broderick, Environmentalists Re-
lease Poll Finding Widespread Opposition to Forest Clearcuts, Nat'l Env't Daily 
(BNA) (Feb. 21, 1996». 
161. Environmental Groups Blast Clinton, supra note 157 (statement by Robert 
Sulnick, executive director, American Ocean Campaign). 
162. Axline, supra note 4, at 637. The Supreme Court reviewed the reasons 
behind the rules banning substantive riders in appropriations bills in Tennessee 
Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190-91 (1978). [d. at 638. 
163. [d. (citing CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANuAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS, 
101ST CONG., rule XXI(2) (1991». 
164. [d. at 637-38 (citing COMMITTEE ON RULES & ADMIN., U.S. SENATE, 102D 
CONG., SENATE MANuAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAws, AND 
RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, rule 16.2 
(1992». In addition, rule 16.4 provides "[nlo amendment offered by any other Sen-
ator which proposes general legislation shall be received to any general appropria-
tion bill, nor shall any amendment not germane or relevant to the subject matter 
contained in the bill be received . ... " [d. at rule 16.4. (emphasis added). 
165. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text. 
166. Axline, supra note 4, at 638-39 (citing 141 Congo Rec. D347 (daily ed. Mar. 
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rules were simply ignored.167 
In addition to the rules discussed above, senators are also 
required to refer substantive matters to the appropriate over-
sight committees for their review. 16B In the case of the sal-
vage rider, however, the appropriate congressional committees 
never reviewed or debated the rider's merits. 169 In fact, the 
accelerated process for appropriations bills allowed the spon-
sors of the rider to avoid answering questions about the fiscal 
and environmental impacts of the rider. 170 Appropriations 
bills almost always bypass the critical components of the legis-
lative process, those designed to reveal misrepresentations and 
erroneous interpretations based on ambiguous language. 171 
Riders subsequently attached to these bills bypass important 
committee hearings and other opportunities for debate. 172 
Moreover, the rider attached to the 1995 Rescissions Act 
was written by a committee which lacked the proper jurisdic-
tion and the requisite experience in writing environmental 
laws. 173 It was written ''behind closed doors, where the public 
interest is most apt to be compromised by special interest 
pleading."174 It is truly ironic that the branch of government 
14, 1995». The Committee on Rules voted 9 to 3 to waive clause 2 of rule XXI. 
ld. at 638 n.169. 
Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Or.), then the chair of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee and Senator Slade Gorton, the chair of the Interior and Related Agen-
cies Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, were two of the princi-
ple sponsors of the salvage rider. ld. at 639 n.173. Senator Hatfield has regularly 
ignored the Senate rules prohibiting the attachment of substantive riders to appro-
priations bills. See Bolduan, supra note 4. 
167. Axline, supra note 4, at 638. 
168. Bolduan, supra note 4, at 370. 
169. ld. The salvage rider should have been reviewed by the Senate Agricultur-
al Committee and the House Agricultural and Interior Committees because it af-
fected the Forest Service. Cf Bolduan, supra note 4, at 370 (discussing the com-
mittees that should have reviewed the riders detailed in the comment). Further-
more, because the rider exempted sales from various environmental laws, it should 
have been reviewed by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and 
the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. ld. Finally, since the rider 
affected the jurisdiction of the federal courts to review agency action, it should 
have been reviewed by the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. ld. 
170. Axline, supra note 4, at 639. 
171. ld. at 638. 
172. Kakuske, supra note 46, at 1867. 
173. ld. 
174. ld. (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council, Stealth Attack: Gutting 
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charged with making the rules which govern the conduct of 
others is apparently not bound by the rules which govern its 
own conduct. Private citizens cannot enforce House and Senate 
rules and must rely on the lawmakers to police themselves. 175 
For this reason alone, these lawmakers should be required to 
adhere to the House and Senate rules and those rules should 
not be waivable. 
The effect of attaching the salvage rider to the Rescissions 
Act, and thereby shielding it from appropriate committee hear-
ings, was to reserve decisions concerning the use of public 
forest lands to the Forest Service and the BLM.176 While 
these agencies may have expertise in the area of timber sales, 
"they are also bureaucratic hierarchies with relatively restrict-
ed missions and associated routines."177 More importantly, 
these agencies are headed by officials who are not accountable 
to the people. l7B Normally the administrative and judicial re-
view processes would remedy this situation. In the case of the 
salvage rider, however, the plain language of the statute elimi-
nated those options.179 
B. THE EFFECT ON PuBLIC PARTICIPATION 
Since 1970, federal law has encouraged broad public par-
Environmental Protection Through the Budget Process (1995». 
175. Axline, supra note 4, at 638. 
176. Cf Bolduan, supra note 4, at 371 (explaining the effect of allowing previ-
ous riders to avoid committee hearings). 
Senator Hatfield has thus moved forest management in 
the [1990s], back to a 1930s New Deal ideal of environ-
mental decision making. According to [the] New Deal 
theory, agency experts should make decisions insulated 
from both central and political control and judicial over-
sight. Only agency expertise could "creatively regulat[e] a 
complex social problem in the public interest." 
Id.(citations omitted). 
177. Id. at 373. 
178. See Kakuske, supra note 46. 
179. § 1611(e), (0. 
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ticipation in the development of environmental policy. ISO Sim-
ilarly, Congress and the courts have encouraged private citi-
zens to participate in the enforcement of those standards once 
they have been promulgated. lSI Generally, administrative re-
view of agency decisions has been readily available and judicial 
review has been limited only by constitutional considerations 
such as standing and ripeness. 182 
The rider contained in the 1995 Rescissions Act represent-
ed a significant departure from existing environmental poli-
cy.183 The rider flatly prohibited administrative review and 
arguably prohibited judicial review. l84 The rider did not con-
tain its own citizen-suit provision and it specifically exempted 
salvage timber and Option 9 sales from enforcement by any 
other existing citizen-suit provisions with its broad declaration 
that these sales automatically complied with all federal envi-
ronmental and natural resource laws.185 It is not surprising 
that, having essentially lost the political and legal arenas, 
many environmentalists feel they "have nothing left but the 
court of public opinion and acts of civil disobedience. "186 
180. Kakuske, supra note 46, at 1860 (citing RoBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVI-
RONMENTAL REGULATION 716 (1992». Public participation can build credibility for 
proposals, help identify issues through diversity of opinion and expertise, enhance 
public understanding, and reduce costs and delays by resolving conflicts without 
resort to litigation. Id. at 1864. 
181. Id. Congress has recognized that the legitimacy of administrative decision 
making is enhanced by opportunities for citizen litigation. Id. at 1874-75. For this 
reason, Congress provided for citizen-suit provisions in the following federal envi-
ronmental laws: The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994); the 
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994); the Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1994); the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1994); the Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (1994); 
the Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1988); the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 
& Supp. V 1993); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988); the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (1988); the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349 (1988); and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety 
Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § 2014 (1988). Id. at 1875 n.104. 
182. Kakuske, supra note 46, at 1860. 
183. Id. at 1861. 
184. § 1611(e), (0. 
185. § 1611(i); see supra note 181. 
186. Curt Wilson, Comment, The 1995 Salvage Timber Sale Rider: A Recipe for 
Environmental Devastation, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 419 (1996) (quoting 
Peter Seeth & Eric Gorski, U.S. Forest Service Goes on the Defensive, OREGONIAN, 
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As one commentator argues, "Congress should not [be able 
to] undermine the will of the people by indirectly attacking the 
substance of popular environmental laws via manipulations of 
the procedural provisions for public participation."187 Both 
Congress and the public should have the opportunity to thor-
oughly debate any restrictions on public participation in envi-
ronmental legislation. l88 In addition, impacts on the public'S 
ability to voice its concerns at both the administrative and 
judicial level should be minimized. 189 
C. MISREPRESENTATION 
In addition to their disregard for congressional rules and 
their effort to stifle public participation, the salvage rider's 
sponsors seriously misrepresented the riders' impacts when 
they presented it to their colleagues.19o Representative Eliza-
beth Furse (D-Or.) circulated a memorandum to her colleagues 
on December 19, 1995, identifying six ways in which Congress 
was misled by the sponsors of the salvage logging rider. 191 
The list begins with the sponsors' assurances that the rider 
was an emergency measure to remove dead and dying 
trees. 192 The rider has subsequently been used, however, to 
Sept. 9, 1995, at AI). 
187. Kakuske, supra note 46, at 1862. 
Those who have severely damaged this 
nation's public and private forest lands, the 
Forest Service and the timber industry, are 
now being placed above the law so they can 
continue to use the chain saw to "restore" the 
forests they have destroyed. . . . All of the 
current forestry bills rattling around Congress 
would eviscerate those rights of meaningful 
public participation that lie at the core of 
American democracy. 
Dorn, supra note 9, at 464 (quoting Oversight Hearing on the Administrative Ap-
peals Process Before the Forest and Public Lands Subcomm. of the Senate Energy 
and Natural Resources Comm., 104th Congo (March 8, 1995) (statement of Barry 
Rosenberg, Director of the Forest Watch Program of the Inland Empire Public 
Lands Council». 
188. Kakuske, supra note 46, at 1862. 
189. [d. 
190. Axline, supra note 4, at 63l. 
191. [d. at 631 n.121 (citing Rep. Elizabeth Furse, Furse Takes Lead in Repeal-
ing Timber Salvage Rider, Press Release (Dec. 7, 1995)). Representative Furse has 
gathered more than 100 co-sponsors for a bill repealing the salvage rider. [d. 
192. [d. The salvage logging rider addresses three categories of timber sales. 
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clear-cut healthy forests. Second, the sponsors claimed the rid-
er would create revenue for the U.S. Treasury.193 On the con-
trary, the rider will end up costing taxpayers billions of dol-
lars. 194 Third, the sponsors told members of Congress the rid-
er would help small businesses and landowners when, in reali-
ty, the rider will actually damage the property rights of private 
timberland owners by driving down timber prices.195 Fourth, 
the sponsors insisted the rider would not harm threatened fish 
and wildlife.196 If that were the case however, it would not 
have been necessary to suspend the laws that previously pro-
tected them. 197 Fifth, the sponsors assured Congress the rider 
would speed implementation of President Clinton's Forest 
Plan.198 Instead, the rider has undermined the plan by re-
quiring the cutting of old growth reserves which the Forest 
Plan was designed to protect.199 Finally, the sponsors stated 
that the rider's section 318 sales provision would only speed 
the harvest of a small number of old sales.2°O The Ninth Cir-
§ 1611(b), (d), (k). Only one category involves salvage sales, and the definition of 
salvage under that category is broad enough to encompass healthy trees. 
§ 1611(a), (b). The other two categories involve the sale of healthy trees. 
§ 1611( d), (k). 
193. Axline, supra note 4, at 631 n.121. 
194. Id. According to the Wilderness Society, the rider will cost the federal 
treasury an estimated $ 430 million to $ 1.5 billion. Dorn, supra note 9, at 479 
(citing Hearings on Timber Salvage Before the House Salvage Timber & Forest 
Health Task Force, 104th Congo (Dec. 19, 1995) (statement of Rep. Elizabeth 
Furse). 
195. Axline, supra note 4, at 631 n.121. 
196. Id. 
197. For detailed lists of sales offered pursuant to the rider that will have 
devastating impacts on ecosystems, see Western Ancient Forest Campaign, A Re-
port to Congress and the American People on the Forest Health Rider (Jan. 5, 
1996) and Headwaters, Timber Sale Victims of the Logging Without Laws Rider 
(Nov. 30, 1995). Axline, supra note 4, at 629 n.10B. 
19B. Id. at 631 n.121. 
199. Id. at 629 n.10B. 
200. Id. at 631 n.121. While some deliberations took place regarding the salvage 
provisions contained in the rider, Congress paid little attention to the provisions 
set forth in subsection (k) based on representations regarding its scope made by 
the rider's sponsors. Dorn, supra note 9, at 472. Mere hours after President 
Clinton singed the Rescissions Act into law, however, several of the rider's spon-
sors sent a letter to the Secretaries stating: 
We want to make it clear that subsection (k) of the sal-
vage legislation applies within the geographic area of 
National Forest units and BLM districts that were subject 
to Section 31B ... and within that geographic area re-
quires the release of all previously offered or awarded 
timber sales, including Section 318 sales as well as sales 
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cuit has since interpreted the rider as applying to every timber 
sale offered between October 1, 1990 and July 27, 1995 in 
Oregon or Washington.201 
In addition to the misrepresentations explained by repre-
sentative Furse, Senator Gorton also repeatedly assured Con-
gress that immediate legislative action was necessary to "avoid 
catastrophic wildfires and to promote forest health. "202 Subse-
quently, Senator Gorton admitted that "[t]he salvage legisla-
tion [was] about one thing and one thing only, and that [was] 
jobs.,,203 The riders sponsors also claimed the salvage rider 
was necessary to offset job losses within the timber industry 
caused by reductions in federal timber supplies.204 The spon-
sors blamed these reductions on the enforcement of various 
environmental laws.205 However, the enforcement of the 
nation's environmental laws was only one of the many factors 
offered or awarded in other years (such as Fiscal Years 
1991-1995) that are not subject to Section 318. The refer-
ence to Section 318 in subsection (k)(1) defines the geo-
graphic area that is subject to subsection (k) .... You 
can expect our active oversight of your implementation of 
the measure .... We expect each of you to provide us 
with written assurances that your agencies intend to 
implement Section [1611] in accordance with the direction 
provided in this letter. 
Axline, supra note 4, at 635 (quoting Letter from Senators Slade Gorton (R-
Wash.), Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska), & Larry Craig (R-Idaho), and Representa-
tives Don Young (R-Alaska), Charles Taylor (R-N.C.), and Pat Roberts (R- Kan.), to 
Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman and Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt 
(July 27, 1995». In addition, immediately after the rider's passage, the timber 
industry filed a lawsuit asking the court to declare that the language in subsec-
tion (k) mandated the release of a similar group of sales. Dorn, supra note 9, at 
473; see supra Part II.C.1. When the district court judge subsequently decided in 
favor of the timber industry, seventeen members of Congress filed an amicus brief 
in the Ninth Circuit declaring they did not intend subsection (k) to have such a 
broad reach. Axline, supra note 4, at 632. 
201. Axline, supra note 4, at 631 n.121. 
202. [d. at 626 (quoting Letter from Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.) to Mem-
bers of the Interior Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee (Mar. 
20, 1995». Many scientists, scholars, and environmentalists have strongly denied 
the existence of a "forest health crisis." Dorn, supra note 9, at 462. 
203. Axline, supra note 4, at 626 n.80 (quoting Furse Seeks Logging Law Re· 
peal, OREGONIAN, Dec. 8, 1995, at B3.) 
204. Kriz, supra note 19 ("people in my state have been suffering because of a 
lack of timber supply," Gorton said.). 
205. As a result, § 1611(i) was included in the Rescissions Act to exempt sal-
vage timber and Option 9 sales from all federal environmental and natural re-
source laws. 
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leading to the decline in timber industry jobs.206 Advances in 
milling technology, the diversion of logs from mills to export 
markets, and an overabundance of timber from nonfederal 
sources have all contributed much more to the loss of jobs. 207 
Moreover, Senator Gorton stated that the rider "provide[d] 
the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management with the 
necessary authority to conduct salvage timber sales to remove 
dead, dying, bug infested and burned timber on federal lands 
nationwide."208 The Forest Service and the BLM, however, 
already had the authority to offer salvage sales independent of 
the salvage logging rider.209 Finally, Senator Gorton claimed 
that if the previously awarded sales covered by § 1611(k) were 
not released, the federal government would be subject to dam-
age claims of "well over $ 100 million."210 This statement was 
disingenuous because Forest Service and BLM timber sale 
contracts contain cancellation provisions that may be invoked 
when necessary for environmental reasons.211 
Outraged by the numerous misrepresentations made by 
the rider's sponsors, on December 7, 1995, Representative 
Furse introduced H.R. 2745, the Restoration of Natural Re-
206. Axline, supra note 4, at 616-17, 622. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 626 (quoting Letter from Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash) to Members 
of the Interior Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee (Mar. 20, 
1995». 
209. Id. The National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994), 
already authorizes the Forest Service to conduct salvage sales. Id. at 626 nn. 81-
83. The BLM has adopted similar regulations at 43 C.F.R. § 5473.4(d) (1995). Id. 
210. Gorton & Kays, supra note 9, at 644. 
211. Axline, supra note 4, at 634 n. 141. A 1994 Forest Service memo stated 
the government would need $ 152 million to compensate loggers whose timber con-
tracts had been set aside in Oregon and Washington. Kriz, supra note 19. Howev-
er, $ 34 million was the figure estimated by the Congressional Research Service. 
Id. 
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source Law on the Public Lands Act.212 As of July 9, 1996, 
H.R. 2745 had 147 co-sponsors.213 Unfortunately, no action 
was taken on H.R. 2745 prior to the close of the 104th Con-
gress. The bill is not likely to be reintroduced as the provisions 
of the rider will have expired by December 31, 1996. 
D. 'PLAIN LANGUAGE' AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN THE CON-
TEXT OF RIDERS 
Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of 
the statute.214 In the case of the salvage rider, it has also 
tended to end there. The courts have found the language in the 
rider to be clear. In those instances where it has been neces-
sary to look beyond the plain language of the rider's provisions, 
the court has found that the congressional intent regarding 
those provisions was also clear. But in reaching their decisions, 
the courts have relied on language crafted to serve special 
interests and congressional intent that was based on misrepre-
sentation. 
The courts have also relied heavily on statements made by 
the rider's sponsors. While there may not be any doubt regard-
ing the sponsors' intent however, the Ninth Circuit has noted 
that "expressions of individual legislators' intent do not neces-
sarily prove congressional intent."215 In the case of the sal-
vage rider, there is substantial doubt as to what Congress 
intended. It is true that the timber amendments did initially 
212. Dorn, supra note 9, at 465 n.136; Restoration of Natural Resources Laws 
on the Public Lands Act of 1995, H.R. 2745, 104th Congo (1995) [hereinafter H.R. 
2745]. The bill would 1) amend federal law to repeal the Emergency Salvage Tim-
ber Sale Program, and 2) direct the Secretaries to suspend all activities being con-
ducted pursuant to the authority provided by that program until it is determined 
that the activity complies with all applicable environmental and natural resource 
laws. H.R. 2745. Shortly after Furse introduced H.R. 2745, she received a letter, 
written by an Oregon timber union official, warning her that her bill was "coun-
terproductive to her current reelection campaign." Kriz, supra note 19. 
213. H.R. 2745. 
214. Oregon Natural Resources Council V. Thomas, No. 95-6272-HO 1995 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 19567, at *4 (D. Or. filed Dec. 5, 1995) (ONRC) (citing Chevron, 
U.S.A, Inc. v. Nattiral Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
215. Bolduan, supra note 4, at 359 (citing Portland Audubon Soc'y V. Hodel, 866 
F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
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enjoy broad support from both Democrats and Republicans. 216 
But given the congressional support for bill designed to repeal 
the provisions of the rider, it can be inferred that the initial 
support of many of the members of Congress was based on the 
misrepresentations made by the rider's sponsors.217 
Misrepresentations aside, if members of Congress continue 
to waive House and Senate rules, their substantive riders 
should not be allowed to hide behind the shield of the plain 
language rule. Instead, the general rule for judicial interpreta-
tion should be a presumption of invalidity for any substantive 
rider attached to an appropriations bill in violation of House 
and Senate rules, whether validly waived or not. The presump-
tion would be rebuttable, but in making its decision, the court 
would be required to examine all the circumstances surround-
ing the enactment of the rider into law. Those circumstances 
would include any misrepresentations made by the rider's 
sponsors, the content and scope of the rider's provisions, in-
cluding any suspension of current laws, and the degree to 
which the proper committees and the public have been exclud-
ed from the process. Undoubtedly, the best rules are the ones 
that are already in place, and if a new rule of judicial interpre-
tation is not forthcoming, members of Congress simply should 
not be allowed to waive the existing rules prohibiting the at-
tachment of substantive riders to appropriations bills. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Fortunately, by the time this note is published, the salvage 
logging rider will have expired. However, the contents of this 
note are still highly relevant for at least three reasons. First, 
although the rider expires on December 31, 1996, the Forest 
Service can award contracts under the rider which extend 
through September 30, 1997.218 Second, some members of 
Congress are actively seeking an extension of the rider, by 
attaching yet another rider to a future appropriations bill.219 
216. Kriz, supra note 19. 
217. Id. 
218. § 1611(b)( 1). 
219. Dorn, supra note 9, at 482 (citing Salvage Logging Law: GOPers Propose 
Changes and Extension, GREENWlRE, Mar. 1, 1996). In 1996, legislation was intro-
duced in the Senate to extend the provisions of the salvage logging rider for 10 
36
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Third, the salvage logging rider was not the first example, nor 
will it be the last, of the damage that can be done when cer-
tain members of Congress are allowed to waive or ignore 
House and Senate rules.220 
House and Senate rules should not be waivable. If mem-
bers of Congress are allowed to waive these rules, their efforts 
should not be rewarded by allowing the laws they create to 
hide behind the shelter of the plain language rule. When sub-
stantive riders are attached to appropriations bills, they should 
be subject to a presumption of invalidity that can only be over-
come by examining all of the circumstances surrounding the 
rider from its conception to its application. This presumption 
would be almost as difficult a barrier for members of Congress 
to overcome as 'arbitrary and capricious' review is for persons 
challenging the riders. Since "[r ]iders that originate in the 
dark of night are unlikely to look attractive in the light of 
day,"221 exposure to "the light" in the form of a presumption 
of invalidity would likely make the practice of attaching sub-
stantive riders to appropriations bills much less desirable. As a 
result, the legislative process might once again serve the public 
interest, not special interests. 
VII. POSTSCRIPT 
A. IDAHO SPORTING CONGRESS, INC. V. UNITED STATES FOR-
EST SERVICE 
Soon after deciding ONRC II, the Ninth Circuit had anoth-
er opportunity to visit arbitrary and capricious review of sal-
vage timber sales. In Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc. v. United 
States Forest Service,222 the Idaho Sporting Congress (ISC) 
years. Don Hopey, Vote Near on Rule Allowing More National Forest Logging; En-
vironmentalists Condemn, Timber Firms Back Salvage Rider, PITISBURGH POST-GA-
ZETTE, July 29, 1996, at B-1. Senator Larry Craig (R-Idaho) has proposed Senate 
Bill 391. [d. In addition to extending the provisions of the salvage rider, the bill 
would set aside large tracts of national forest land as "logging priority zones." 
Healthy trees located in logging priority zones could be cut along with dead and 
dying trees. [d. 
220. See generally, Bolduan, supra note 4. 
221. Axline, supra note 4, at 638. 
222. 92 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1996) ([SC). 
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alleged that, with respect to three forest projects and seven 
associated timber sales, the Forest Service had violated the 
Rescissions Act, the Administrative Procedure Act,223 a presi-
dential directive,224 an interagency Memorandum of Agree-
mene25 concerning the implementation of the Rescissions 
Act, and the public trust doctrine.226 The court first held that 
because § 1611(0 of the Rescissions Act provides a specific 
mechanism for judicial review and offers a remedy, if appropri-
ate, for every salvage timber sale, the APA is not applicable to 
223. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (West 1996 & Supp. 1996). 
224. In his directive the President stated: 
I intend to carry out the objectives of the relevant timber-
related activities authorized by Public Law 104-19 [the 
Rescissions Act]. I am also firmly committed to doing so 
in ways that, to the maximum extent allowed, follow our 
current environmental laws and programs. Public Law 
104-19 gives us discretion to apply current environmental 
standards to the timber salvage program, and we will do 
so. With this in mind, I am directing each of you . . . to 
move forward expeditiously to implement these timber-
related provisions in an environmentally sound manner, in 
accordance with my Pacific Northwest Forest Plan, other 
existing forest and land management policies and plans, 
and existing environmental laws, except those procedural 
actions prohibited by Public Law 104-19. 
. . . I am directing that you enter into a Memo-
randum of Agreement . .. to make explicit the new 
streamlining procedures, coordination, and consultation 
actions that I have previously directed you to develop and 
that you have implemented under existing environmental 
laws. 
ISC, 92 F.3d at 926. 
225. The Memorandum of Agreement stated: 
THE PARTIES AGREE TO 
1. Comply with previously existing environmental laws ex-
cept where expressly prohibited by Public Law 104-19, 
notably in the areas of administrative appeals and judicial 
review. In particular, the parties agree to implement 
salvage sales under Public Law 104-19 with the same 
substantive environmental protection as provided by other-
wise applicable environmental laws and in accordance 
with the provisions of this MOA. 
2. . .. Adhere to the standards and guidelines in applica-
ble Forest Plans and Land Use Plans and their amend-
ments and related conservation strategies. . . . 
Id. at 926; Memorandum of Agreement on Timber Salvage Related Activities Un-
der Public Law 104-19, between United States Department of Agriculture, United 
States Department of the Interior, United States Department of Commerce, United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (Aug. 9, 1995). 
226. ISC, 92 F.3d at 924. 
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timber sales covered by the Rescissions Act.227 The court then 
held that the sales did not violate the Rescissions Act because 
they were not arbitrary and capricious. In addition, based on 
its holding in Inland Empire Public Lands Council and the 
plain language of the Rescissions Act, the court had no author-
ity to review the Presidential directive or the Memorandum of 
Agreement. Finally, because it lacked the authority to review 
salvage timber sales covered by the Rescissions Act under any 
other environmental law, the court could not consider ISC's 
claim that the Forest Service breached its duty to protect the 
public resource trust.228 
B. SIERRA CLUB V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE 
The scope of the language of the salvage timber sales pro-
vision was then litigated in Sierra Club v. United States Forest 
Service.229 In Sierra Club, the court was required to deter-
mine when "preparation" of a salvage timber sale ends for 
purposes of the Rescissions Act.230 The action was a NEPA 
challenge to several proposed salvage timber sales in the 
Warner Creek area of Oregon.231 After plaintiffs filed their 
complaint, Congress passed the Rescissions Act, eliminating 
the need to comply with NEPA when developing salvage tim-
ber sales.232 The Act applied to all salvage timber sales "in 
preparation" on the date of enactment.233 On the date that 
the Act went into effect, the Warner Creek sales were at two 
different stages: a small portion of the timber had already been 
advertised and offered, although not yet released, and the 
remainder of the timber had completed the necessary reporting 
procedures but had not yet been advertised.234 With regard to 
the advertised sales, the court found that § 1611(b) did not 
apply, but that § 1611(k) mandated the release of those sales 
227. [d. at 925. 
228. [d. at 927-28. 
229. 93 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 1996) (Sierra Club). 
230. [d. at 611. § 1611(b)(3) states: "Any salvage timber sale in preparation on 
the date of the enactment of this Act [July 27, 1995] shall be subject to the provi-
sions of this section." § 1611(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
231. Sierra Club, 93 F.3d at 611. 
232. [d. 
233. § 1611(b)(3). 
234. Sierra Club, 93 F.3d at 612. 
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and rendered plaintiff's NEPA claim moot.235 With regard to 
the unadvertised sales, the court found that Congress gave 
"preparation" a special and specific meaning for the purposes 
of the Act alone, and that meaning could be gleaned through 
the use of the term elsewhere in the statute.236 Accordingly, 
the court held that § 161l(b) broadly applied to all salvage 
timber sales which had not yet been advertised on the date of 
the enactment, including the unadvertised sales at issue in the 
case.237 
C. SOUTHWEST CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. 
GLICKMAN 
Finally, 42 days prior to the expiration of the salvage rid-
er, the Ninth Circuit decided Southwest Center for Biological 
Diversity v. Glickman.238 In Southwest Center, the Center 
filed an action claiming that a proposed salvage timber sale in 
the Coronado National Forest violated the Rescissions Act 
because the Biological Assessment and Evaluation (BA&E) 
prepared by the Forest Service did not comply with the Act's 
requirements.239 In addition, the Center argued that conclu-
sions contained in, and stemming from, the BA&E were arbi-
trary and capricious and that extra-record documents had been 
erroneously struck by the district court. 240 
The Forest Service had designated 69 of 27,500 acres 
burned in a 1994 forest fire as suitable for salvage.241 A 
BA&E conducted by a· Forest Service biologist concluded that 
the sale would have no effect on the Mexican Spotted Owl, an 
endangered species.242 This conclusion was in direct conflict 
with an internal Fish and Wildlife Services policy.243 Based 
on the "no effect" determination, and despite the conflict, the 
235. [d. at 614. 
236. [d. at 612-13. 
237. [d. at 613. 
238. 100 F.3d 1443 (9th Cir. 1996) (Southwest Center). 
239. [d. at 1445. For a discussion of the Act's requirements, see supra Part 
H.A.l. 
240. Southwest Center, 100 F.3d at 1445. 
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Forest Service categorically excluded the salvage sale from any 
further environmental assessment under NEP A. 244 
In affirming the lower court's decision, that failure to pre-
pare an EAlBE was not a per se violation of the Rescissions 
Act, the Ninth Circuit looked first to the adequacy of the For-
est Service's documentation.245 Finding that, in some cases, 
NEPA allowed for the issuance of a categorical exclusion in 
place of an EA and that the proposed sale met the criteria, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the BA&E met the demands of the 
Rescissions Act.246 The court stated that "sections of a statute 
generally should be read to give effect, if possible, to every 
clause," and that where a statute is ambiguous, "the question 
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute."247 The court conclud-
ed that it must defer to the Secretary's decision that a docu-
ment other than a combined EAlBE could be used to satisfy 
the Act's requirements, provided the document complied with 
NEPA and the ESA. 248 
The Ninth Circuit next reviewed the Forest Service's con-
clusions. The Center argued that the Forest Service's disregard 
of the Fish and Wildlife Service's Mexican Spotted Owl policy 
constituted a failure to consider an important aspect of the 
problem and was thus arbitrary and capricious.249 Despite 
the Forest Service's commitment to the Memorandum of Agree-
ment, the Ninth Circuit found that the Forest Service had no 
obligation to consider other agencies' views because the Memo-
randum was not legally binding.250 The court also cited its 
previous decision in Inland Empire for its conclusion that the 
Secretary had discretion to disregard the effect of a salvage 




247. Southwest Center, 100 F.3d at 1448. 
248. [d. 
249. [d. 
250. [d. at 1449. 
251. [d. 
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Finally, the Ninth Circuit upheld the exclusion of a letter 
from the Regional Forester to the Forest Supervisors detailing 
"interagency consultation procedures required for compliance 
with the ESA in salvage timber sales under the Rescissions 
Act," because it was issued one month after the approval of the 
proposed sale.252 Similarly, several maps and declarations 
were struck because the information they contained was dupli-
cated elsewhere in the record.253 
Julie A. Coldicott" 
252. Southwest Center, 100 F.3d at 1449. 
253. Id. 
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